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POWER AND COOPERATION: UNDERSTANDING
THE ROAD TOWARDS A TRUTH COMMISSION
Ming Zhu*

Abstract
Truth commissions, usually described as a softer
transitionaljustice alternative to trials, gained traction in
academic circles following the establishment of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Though they
are praised for their value in societal reconciliation and
widely recognizedfor their flexibility; little is understoodof
their causalfactors or requirements. This Article turns to
this hole in the research and examines the effects of one
potential causal variable,the balance of power between the
warring parties. Through an in-depth examination of four
case studies, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and East Timor, this Article finds that truth commissions are more
likely to be implementedfollowing conflicts that have ended
without a clear and absolute winner. The analysis suggests
two things:first, scholars should shift from the ends-based
analysis of what works best to the means-based analysis of
what will be possible; and second, a quest for truth may
first require a need for compromise.
We cannot be facile and say bygones will be
bygones, because they will not be bygones and will return
to haunt us. True reconciliation is never cheap, for it is
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based on forgiveness which is costly. You cannot forgive
what you do not know.
- Archbishop Tutu1

Given the continuing violence in places like the Sudan, Iraq, and
East Timor, discussions of post-conflict transitions and reconstructions have

been appearing with increasing frequency in academic, political, and civil
society circles. 2 One of the most important aspects of a post-conflict transition is the pursuit of a transitional justice mechanism to address the atrocities committed during the course of the conflict. Transitional justice
mechanisms can help restore the rule of law, strengthen democratic institutions, provide a form of retribution for victims, promote national peace and

unity,3 and, perhaps most importantly, provide recuperating states with a
sense of justice and legal order.4 As Gary Bass notes, "the treatment of
humbled or defeated enemy leaders and war criminals can make the difference between war and peace. ' ' 5 Transitional justice options span from retributive justice, taking the form of trials and reparations, to restorative
justice, advanced through informal or formal amnesty. 6 Somewhere in between trials and amnesty lies a relatively unnoticed option: the truth
commission.

7

As a midpoint between tribunals and amnesty, truth commissions
are often criticized as purely symbolic mechanisms that fail to employ the
sticks of trials or the carrots of amnesty agreements-"at best an empty gesture and at worst a fig leaf covering up continued abuses."' 8 Yet, even a
symbolic option is better than nothing, as complete inaction can result in
1 Response by Archbishop Tutu on his appointment as Chairperson of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, November 30 1995.
2
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For a discussion of all the transitional justice strategies available and their relative relations to one another, see AMSTUTZ, supra note 3, at 18-40.
7 S. Sandile Ngcobo, Truth, Justice, and Amnesty in South Africa: Sins from the
Past and Lessons for the Future, 8 lus GENTIUM a, 1 (2002) ("a truth commission... is really a compromise between prosecution and doing nothing at all").
8
See Jack Synder and Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors:Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of InternationalJustice, 28:3 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5-44
6

(2003), with particular emphasis on page 33.
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deadly self-help, as witnessed by the retribution killings of World War I
prior to the establishment of the Nuremburg trials and the Tutsi vigilante
killings of unincarcerated Hutu genocidaires. 9 It is true that many truth
commissions have been forced to compromise justice for the sake of peace
or stability, 10 but even a compromised truth commissions has much to offer.
In El Salvador, a sweeping amnesty passed close on the heels of the commission's report release. In South Africa, the truth commission offered amnesty to cooperating individuals. Yet, these two commissions are arguably
two of the most constructive truth commissions ever created."' Even if approached as the least-common denominator or option of last resort, truth
12
commissions are better than nothing.
Academic scholarship on truth commissions, though late in coming,
has covered an impressive amount of ground. Much has been written about
specific truth commissions, most often those of South Africa, the "model"
truth commission, El Salvador, the success of Latin America, and East Timor and Sierra Leone, the attempts to combine truth commissions and
tribunals. 3 In terms of generalized or comparative scholarship, scholars
9

BASS, supra note 5, at 305.

10 See Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond, in
TELLING THE TRUTHS

83, 84 (Tristan Anne Borer ed., 2006).

11 El Salvador is celebrated for being one of the few truth commissions that saw
steady implementation of the report's pointed recommendations. See Hayner, Reflections on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at 40. South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission eventually took testimonies from
over 21,000 victims and witnesses and received over seven thousand applications
for amnesty from perpetrators volunteering to testify before the TRC for their participation and appeasement in the apartheid. Domestically, South Africa's TRC was
credited for being the first large-scale, indigenous departure from formal punitive
justice. Interview with Sivu Maqungo, Legal Affairs Counselor at the Permanent
Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, Personal Interview, (Dec. 17, 2004).
12 See Llewellyn, supra note 10, at 87 ("Truth commissions are... a second best
option, but they are nevertheless better than nothing in situations where 'full' justice is not possible.").
13 For more information on these case studies, see the following articles. (El Salvador): T. Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador,
27(3) VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, (1994); Mike Kaye, The
Role of Truth Commissions in the Searchfor Justice, Reconciliation and Democratization: The Salvadorian and Honduran Cases, 29 JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN
STUDIES, 693, (1997); (Sierra Leone): Priscilla B. Hayner, Reflections on the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, July 19, 1999, available at http://
www.article19.org/docimages/728.htm (last visited May 21, 2009); (South Africa):
Anthea Jeffrey, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: South Africa 's Truth and
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have looked at how truth commissions have been helpful and how they
have been limited; they have also studied how best to design a truth com14
mission in order for it to be part of the former category.
However, one topic is noticeably absent: few scholars have analyzed the requirements for the initial establishment of a truth commission.
In our eagerness to evaluate the track record of this abnormal player in the
field transitional justice, we have overlooked the question of when it gets to
come off of the bench. 15 Though theories and evaluations of the effectiveness and impact of truth commissions are interesting, they are, practically
speaking, completely useless if the truth commission cannot be implemented in the first place. This Article examines one factor - the balance of
power between the warring parties - in the broader hope of shifting the
current scholarship towards a more means-based, as opposed to ends-based,
analysis.
The core argument of this Article thus rests on the balance of power
following a conflict's conclusion and the consequential effect on the establishment of a truth commission. 16 Relying on personal interviews with indiReconciliation Commission, 14(4) NEGOTIATION JOURNAL (1999); (East Timor):
Patrick Burgess, Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor: The Relationship Between the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and the Courts, 15
(1-2) CRIMINAL LAW FORUM, Mar. 2004, at 135-58; Piers Pigou, Crying Without

Tears: In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste,
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES,

INTERNATIONAL

Aug. 2003, avail-

able at <http://www.ictj.org/downloads/Crying-WithoutTears-designed.pdf>.
14
See, e.g., Martha Minow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (noting in particular the
ability of truth commissions to enable a society, and each individual victim, to
mourn and move on); TEITEL, supra note 4 (employing an inductive method to
argue that the amount of justice pursued is highly influenced by the nature of the
transition); HAYNER, supra note 11, at 40 (discussing the roles of past truth commissions in a country's political transition and the importance of addressing the
past in order to create a stable future); Georgina Mensah-Datsa, "Elements of Design: What Makes Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Fail?," Harvard Law
School LLM Paper, Spring 2005 (proposing a checklist of factors for success,
namely, political will, civil society participation, consensus building, truth-telling,
and sufficient resources).
15 Scholars have suggested a few requirements, though none have been authoritatively surveyed or analyzed. Chief among the requirements suggested include international attention, timeliness or a "window of opportunity," a balance of
atrocities, and regional trends.
16 This concept is drawn from the leading political science theory of realism,
which assumes that the dynamics of geo-political power are integral to all decisions

HISTORY
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viduals involved with each of the truth commission establishments and
declassified governmental documents, 17 this Article examines four examples of successful 18 truth commission establishments, 19 thereby providing
insight into the relationship between the decision to establish a truth commission and the balance of power in the conflict country. I argue that these
case studies share one trait in common: the parties involved retained a relatively even balance of power. In other words, the analysis suggests that
truth commissions are only considered when all warring parties 20 have some
within a nation's political existence. For further reading on realism, see the readings of John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Krasner. Perhaps list a
definitive text for each of these authors or perhaps just the first?
17 Interviewees include academic scholars, foreign governmental officials, US
governmental officials, civil society experts, and human rights activists, providing a
mixture of personal and official accounts and testimonies.
18 For the purpose of this Article, a "successful" establishment of a truth commission must be: 1) sanctioned by the government, 2) pursued within five years of the
conflict's resolution, and 3) followed by a public distribution of their findings.
Truth commissions conducted by non-governmental organizations or third-party interest groups are disqualified because they involve cases where the government
proved uninterested or unable to authorize an official commission; these are precisely the cases where the campaign for a truth commission failed. Examples of
such "unsuccessful" truth commissions include Brazil, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and
The Philippines. Truth commissions established prior to a conflict's conclusion
bear obvious doubts of impartiality; no government wishing to stay in power and in
international favor would impartially research its own atrocities in the ongoing civil
war. Five years stands as the cutoff date because a truth commission established
more than five years after a conflict's resolution implies that another mechanism
was employed in the meantime; the truth commission was officially, or unofficially, passed over as the justice instrument of first resort. Finally, commissions
that fail to release some form of their findings are excluded; for without public
access, even the most extensive investigations would be effectively worthless to the
victims, perpetrators, and the international community at large.
19 I would like to emphasize the difference between my focus on a successful
establishment of a truth commission and the successfulness of the truth commission
itself. The success of a truth commission itself will likely depend on the degree of
detail and dissemination; some would argue that any truth commission is a success
while others would insist that no inquiry is a true success unless specific perpetrators are mentioned and brought to justice. This Article does not enter this debate;
for our purposes, the ensuing "success" of the truth commission itself is irrelevant it is the successful creation of the truth commission that matters.
20 The "parties" involved are usually governmental military forces and rebel
groups, but the conflicting sides could also be majority and minority political parties, right-wing and left-wing proponents, peasants and bourgeoisie, etc.
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form of leverage, thus creating a need for compromise. 2 1 Part One examines the traditional type of truth commissions, those examining the atrocities of previous military regimes or dictatorships, specifically through the
case studies of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. Starting from a historical
summary, each country's narrative then proceeds to the formation of the
truth commission and concludes with insights on the need for a balance of
power. Part Two follows a similar process leading to the most recent truth
commissions, those created following fights for state independence, here
exemplified by the story of East Timor. The Article concludes with a look
at the relevancy of this discussion within the broader questions of transitional justice and the policy implications therein.
The current literature on truth commissions and transitional justice
touches on power dynamics, but to a very limited degree and always from a
political science perspective. For example, Eric Bahm notes the importance
of a "balance of forces," suggesting that truth commission are more likely
to be established when a new government is forced to deal with a stillinfluential past regime. 22 However, Bahm never develops or analyzes this
claim-his research focuses instead on the factors used in evaluating truth
commissions. Other scholars have explored specific facets of power such
as the type of regime transition, balance of civilian and military power, or
the level of civil society participation; but a comprehensive discussion of
domestic power dynamics remains missing. 23 The most pertinent study
conducted to date was published in 1999 by Elin Skaar. Skaar hypothesized
that "policy choice will tend towards trials as the outgoing regime becomes
weaker and away from trials as the outgoing regime becomes stronger,"
21

Seei, Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J., 69

,80 (2003) (writing that "in countries where military rule ended without clear political transition, as in Brazil, or following difficult negotiations, as in Uruguay, governmental investigation was out of the question.")
22 Eric Brahm, Getting to the Bottom of the Truth: Evaluating the Contribution of
Truth Commissions to Post Conflict Societies, Presented at the Wisconsin Institute
for Peace and Conflict Studies 20th Annual Conference "Challenges and Paths to
Justice", Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, (Oct. 6-8, 2004), 26,..
available at http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/ITJWeb/JusticeConfPapers/Brahm.
pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
23 See TL Karl & Schmitter, Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and

Eastern Europe, 43

INT'L

SOC. Sci. J., 269, 269-289 (1991); Yannick Hingorani,

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: OperationalFramework, CONFLICT

PRE-

VENTION AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION NETWORK, THE CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY,

available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/

IMAGES.NSF/vLUlmages/Peacebuilding4/$file/C-Truth-EN.pdf (last visited Dec.
5, 2008); HAYNER, supra note 11, at 234.
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thus resulting in truth commissions when "the relative strength of the conflicting demands is roughly equal." 24 Skaar conducted an empirical analysis
of all truth commission attempts before 1999, coding each attempt as successful and unsuccessful, each outgoing regime as "strong," "defeated," or
"weak," and the impact of public demand as "strong" or "weak". Skaar's
analysis is limited, however, as it only compares the outgoing government
25
to "public demand," which is defined as civilians and civil society,
thereby ignoring the impact of the current government, the international
community, and the outgoing military.
This Article brings all of these missing factors into the analysis and,
through narrative anecdotes and personal interviews, offers a qualitative
perspective that is missing from the current scholarship.
I.
A.

MILITARY TRANSITIONS

El Salvador: War of Ideology

The civil war in El Salvador originated in clashes of class and ideology, rather than from religion or ethnicity. Anti-governmental insurgency
forces drawn mostly from poor, rural areas had been gathering for decades
since the beginning of military rule in 1931, but the momentum found its
peak in 1970s and the 1980s, as the military stepped up its death-squad
killings and massacres. 26 On October 10th, 1980, five of the main insurgency groups decided to merge their forces and created an operational, political, and military alliance, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN). The groups were quite varied in nature, drawing from Marxism,
Marxism-Leninism, Anti-Marxism, reformism, communism, militarism,
and social democratic theories, and operated through various acts of civil
disobedience. Once banded together, these left-wing forces collectively
launched a two-prong strategy of economic sabotage and guerilla warfare,
moving to more drastic means such as political kidnappings, assassinations,
27
and bombings.
Elin Skaar, Truth Commissions, Trials-or Nothing? Policy Options in Democratic Transitions, 20(6) THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 1109, 1109 (1999).
25
Skaar, supra note 24, at 1116.
26 Jack Spence, Post War Transitions: Elections and PoliticalPartiesin El Salva24

dor and Nicaragua,LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

CONGRESS,

Guadala-

jara, Mexico, (Apr. 17-19 1997), 5-6.
27 "El Salvador," The Library of Congress Country Studies available at <http://
reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/el-salvador/el-salvador 130.html>,

visited Dec. 5, 2008).

(last
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The first FMLN offensives occurred during the presidency of Jose
Napoleon Duarte, who assumed power in 1980 through a military coup following a string of largely fraudulent elections. To counter the actions of the
FMLN, his government built up their paramilitary forces and launched a
campaign of death squads and intimidation. Between the military assassinations and the paramilitary massacres, tens of thousands of guerrilla fighters and civilians were murdered. Within the first four years of the war
alone, over forty thousand individuals, mostly civilians, died at the hands of
the death squads. 28 There was a cyclical effect: governmental repression
focused primarily on groups associated with reform efforts, such as
Catholics, rural peasants, or labor unions, as a result, more of their members
joined the FMLN, which then caused the government to increase their repression efforts.
By 1983, the FMLN stood at the brink of victory, strengthened by
shipments of military equipment and ammunition from Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Vietnam. Fortunately for the El Salvadoran government, the United
States stepped in, sending in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military and economic aid. 29 Faced with the government's newly fortified military force, the FMLN proved unable to defeat the El Salvadorian military
and the conflict converged into a strategic stalemate.
Peace talks were first proposed and discussed in 1983, but it wasn't
until October of 1984 that the various governmental and rebel representatives were able to come together in the little town of La Palma. Progress
was slow, however, as FMLN kidnappings and violent paramilitary sweeps
continued to occur. In 1985, the talks stonewalled with the kidnapping of
President Duarte's daughter and the subsequent release of hundreds of
FMLN prisoners in exchange for her safety. In October of 1987, President
Duarte signed the Central American Peace Agreement with the Presidents
of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, promising to cease
hostilities, implement democratic elections, and begin the repatriation and
resettlement of displaced persons. 30 Once again, however, peace negotiations were cut short by insurgency violence and governmental killings, in
particular, the murder of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero in March of
1980.31
28

Charles Call, Assessing El Salvador's Transitionfrom Civil War to Peace, in

Stedman ET AL., supra note 2, at 548.
29 Id. at 545-50.
30 Guatemalan Agreement for Peace in Central America, US Department of State
Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1987 available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m
1079/is n2127_v87/ai_6101621 (Dec. 5, 2008).
31 Call, supra note 28, at 546.
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The inability of Duarte' s government to broker a peace deal greatly
boosted the Nationalist Republican Alliance's (ARENA) rise to political
power, According to 1987 national polls, 83 percent of the population supported a negotiated settlement to the war.3 2 Supported by corporations and
rural farmers alike, and capitalizing on the speculations of corruption within
Duarte's administration and the continually mounting casualties of civil
war, ARENA's Alfredo Cristiani ousted Duarte in the 1989 presidential
elections. 33 Unfortunately, the change in government did not bring an end
to the violence. It was not until the demise of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent dissolution of the ideological motivations fueling the conflict
that El Salvador truly considered a resolution.
A full appreciation of the political environment in which El Salvador decided to establish a truth commission requires an understanding of the
conflict's importance to and reliance upon international actors, or specifically, the United States. Due to the FMLN's connections to the Marxist and
populist movements, the United States had a sizeable interest in a governmental victory, which kept the money rolling in. By 1984, annual spending
reached $197 million, staying between $80 million and $137 million per
year for the remainder of the war.3 4 The U.S. influenced the El Salvadorian
political scene as well, pressuring the government to draft a new constitution35 and pumping $1.8 million into the 1984 elections to ensure the victory of Jose Napoleon Duarte, which was then used to convince a skeptical
U.S. Congress to continue funding the military campaign against the
FMLN, at the cost of $1.2 million per day. 36 All told, U.S. economic aid
from 1980 to 1991 totaled $3.15 billion, and military aid totaled $1.1
37
billion.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the ideological basis of support
for the El Salvadoran government quickly lost its significance. Around the
same time, the international community began to take note of the severity
Id. at 549.
US Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, El Salvador-Background Notes, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm#
32

33

history>, (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
34 Call, supra note 28, at 547 (citing
CENTRAL AMERICA:

POLITICAL

JAMES DUNKERLEY, THE PACIFICATION OF

CHANGE

IN THE ISTHMUS

1987- 1993 app. 7

(1994)).
35 Charles T. Call, Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the
Rule of Law in El Salvador, 35 J. LAT. AMER. STUD., 827-862, 831 (2003).
36 Call, supra note 28, at 547 (citing Terry Karl, El Salvador'sNegotiated Revolution, 71:2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 147, 150, (1992)).
37 Id. (citing Dunkerley, The Pacification, app. 7 (1994)).

192

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15

and atrocious nature of the governmental anti-insurgency campaigns. In
November of 1989, the six Jesuit priests were brutally mutilated and murdered at Central American University. 38 US intelligence correctly suspected the involvement of the El Salvadorian military and subsequently
suspended all US military aid. 39 The new Bush administration also reined
40
back political aid, moving towards a more pragmatic, negotiated solution.
Following widespread international attention and media coverage, the leaders of the other Central American countries appealed to the United Nations
for assistance in ending the civil war in El Salvador. 41 Having lost the
backing of the United States and facing mounting international pressure, the
El Salvadorian government grudgingly accepted UN-mediated negotiations.
The end of the Cold War also dealt a fatal blow to the FMLN. At
its peak, the FMLN controlled one-third of the country's territory. 42 Without the continued US support, the potential for a FMLN victory weighed
heavily on the minds of the military. However, with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the loss of Cuban and Nicaraguan support, the potential for a
governmental victory weighed equally as heavily on the minds of the
FMLN.
Peace negotiations were extremely slow. During the early rounds,
the government offered amnesty to the guerilla forces in exchange for a
cessation of hostilities and peaceful participation in an open election. The
FMLN refused this offer, insisting upon a power-sharing arrangement, with
political representation in the interim government as well, and the continued
maintenance of an independent military force. 43 Lisa Magarrell, senior associate and El Salvadoran expert at the International Center for Transitional
Justice (ICTJ), commented that such sentiments prevented punitive prosecutions. In a paradox of sorts, the FMLN wanted justice for the governmental perpetrators, but knew that broad prosecutions could result in their
38

Id. at 550.

United States Central Intelligence Agency de-classified intelligence memorandum, HPSCI Staff Briefing on Reporting Related to the Murder of- the Jesuit
Priests in El Salvador, (Nov. 21, 1991), 2 pages; National Security Archives Document EL00362, 2, 5 (accessed May 10, 2005).
40 Jean E. Krasno, A Group of Friends of the Secretary-General.A Useful Diplomatic Tool, Yale University, available at http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/
krasno/krasno.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
4" Terry Karl, El Salvador'sNegotiated Resolution, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 147, 154
(1992).
42 Call, supra note 35, at 831.
43 Peace Talks, http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/el-salvador/elsalvadorl32.html (Feb. 2, 2009).
39

2009

POWER AND COOPERATION

own incrimination and a loss of international political support. Therefore,
to successfully play a political role in the future, they had to avoid the potentially damaging effects of trials. 44 Both sides were highly aware that
possession of political power, or lack thereof, was critical. In the same train
of thought, both sides avoided serious consideration of prosecutions, being
equally fearful of the potential consequences in terms of international support and domestic election results. Eventually, the idea of a truth commission appeared within the United Nations-created independent negotiation
45
committee and was deemed acceptable to both sides.
The story in El Salvador can be exemplified in the response to the
report eventually released by the truth commission. Though the comprehensiveness and detail attempted and reached by the El Salvadorian commission's report was quite impressive, hopes of consequential hard-line
demands of individual accountability crashed to the ground following the
sweeping amnesty passed five days after the report's release. The Legislative Assembly effectively nullified all civil and criminal liabilities for political crimes committed during the war. 46 In fact, few of the
recommendations, including the compensation of victims and their families,
institutional reforms, and public acknowledgment and apology by the perpetrators, have since been undertaken. 47 The government had a great personal interest in avoiding prosecution and as a result, the truth commission
had done all that it could.
B.

Guatemala: The Thirty-Six Year Insurgency

Guatemala's civil war covered ideological, ethnic, and political
conflicts; it pitted right-wing conservatives against left-wing liberals and
intellectuals against the military, all the while laying the brunt of the violence and bloodshed upon the indigenous Mayan population inadvertently
caught in the crossfire. The conflict began as a nonviolent socialist movement, originating in the growth of the Communist party, especially after it
Interview with Lisa Magarrell, Senior Associate and El Salvadoran expert, International Center for Transitional Justice, in N. Y., N.Y. (Dec. 15, 2004).
45 Id. (confirmed in informal consultations by an anonymous member of the El
Salvador Mission to the UN personally involved with the truth commission
negotiations.).

44

U.S. Dept. Of State, Background Note: El Salvador, Human Rights and PostWar Reforms, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm (last visited
46

Jan. 29, 2009).
47 Truth Commission, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador,
available at http://www.truthcommission.org/commission.php?cid=2&casex=O&
lang=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
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was officially legalized by President-elect Jacobo Arbenz. The movement
drew support from the growing dissatisfactions of the poor, eventually expanding their influence over the government, labor organizations, and political parties. The CIA, alarmed that the Communists were targeting a
country "in America's backyard," quickly launched a covert operation, PBSUCCESS, which eventually brought about the 1954 coup that successfully
48
removed Colonel Arbenz from office.
Though the military coup leaders handed over political power to the
civilian government, they demanded a carte blanche with respect to defense
matters and a veto over new governmental appointments. ,49 As a result,
most of the "civilian" presidents were veterans of military counterinsurgency campaigns. In November of 1960, nationalists upset by the government's decision to allow CIA operatives to train Cuban exiles on
50
Guatemalan soil staged a rebellion that nearly toppled the administration.
Backed by CIA forces, the revolt was suppressed, but many of the rebel
leaders survived, leaving to join the guerilla movements that would keep
51
Guatemala in civil war for the next thirty-six years.
While the leftist rebel forces, organized under the umbrella Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), committed a sizeable number of human rights violations through forced disappearances, torture
sessions, and mass killings, military forces bore responsibility for an overwhelming majority of the death count. According to the truth commission
report, state actions, "although varying in intensity, were prolonged and
continuous," accounting for 93 percent of the total human rights viola-

48

NICK CULLATHER,

CIA's
1952-1954 2 (1999).

SECRET HISTORY:

OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA,
49 RONALD H. McDONALD,

785, 786 (1969) (reviewing

49

THE

CLASSIFIED ACCOUNT

THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL

EDUARDO GALEANO,

GUATAMALA,

PAlS

OF ITS

REVIEW
OCUPADO

(1967)).
50 Stephen M. Streeter, Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the contradictions of the alliance for progress, 27 THIRD
WORLD QUARTERLY 57, 59 (2006).
51 The main guerrilla groups included

the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the
People
(ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces
Organization
of
Armed
Revolutionary
(FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). These organizations combined to
form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982. (Source:
U.S. Dept. of State, BackgroundNote: Guatemala, available at <http://www.state.

gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm> (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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tions. 5 2 Though the civil conflict dragged on for over thirty years, 91 percent of the deaths occurred during the presidencies of Generals Romeo
Lucas Garcia and Efrain Rios Montt, who employed the philosophy, "If you
are with us, we'll feed you; if not, we'll kill you." '5 3 Over the course of their
presidencies, the military massacred tens of thousands of civilians and extinguished over 400 villages.5 4 The government also gathered a wide-reaching database of informants that gave rise to a marked increase in
assassinations and forced disappearances of opposition leaders and religious
figures. Though resilient, the guerrilla forces lost any true hope for a military victory, relying instead on its alliances with social movements and civil
society for survival. 55 Montt was eventually displaced and subsequent leaders began, largely unsuccessfully, to reign in the military and push the Guatemala government towards reform and democracy. In the late 1980s, the
presidential administrations finally began negotiations to end the civil war,
a process that eventually took six years to complete.
The decision to establish a truth commission in Guatemala was the
result of a three-way struggle for power between the government, the military, and the URNG. Though the government may have been willing to go
further in terms of punitive accountability, the high degree of military influence prevented the civilian leaders from acting autonomously. According
to a confidential State Department cable of 1994, the relationship between
the government and the military was like a "marriage-they are mutually
dependent and neither party will make a major decision without consulting
the other, nor will either one pursue any course of action that the other
strongly opposes. '56 According to academic experts, the situation was even
harsher. Stanley and Holiday describe the civilian government as "extremely weak," holding "only tenuous authority and autonomy," against a
military accustomed to autonomy. 57 Sanctioned by the Constitution to
Human Rights Violations, Acts of Violence, and Assignment of Responsibility,
82, Conclusions: Guatemala, Memory of Silence, available at <http://shr.aaas.org/

52

guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc2.html>, (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
53 Raymond Bonner, Guatemala Enlists Religion Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18,
1982, at 3.
54 William Stanley & David Holiday, Broad Participation,Diffuse Responsibility:
Peace Implementation in Guatemala, in Stedman ET AL., supra note 2, at 426.
55

Id.

56

Marilyn McAffee to Dept. of State, Background Pointsfrom DAO for General

McCaffrey, United States Embassy, Guatemala, Confidential Cable 005181, May
27, 1994, Guatemala and the U.S., GU01824, The National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.
57 Stanley & Holiday, supra note 54, at 426.
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"maintain the independence, sovereignty, and honor of Guatemala," the
military was accustomed to playing an active role in peace negotiations or
58
in any other situation where its own power might be threatened.
While the Guatemalan military recognized their control over the
government and their superiority in military prowess in relation to the
UNRG, they also recognized the importance of political power and their
less dominant position in that realm. As stated in a secret US Defense Intelligence cable, "the generals were insistent that the army not allow the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity to force, through political and
international pressure, the army into a truth commission that was one sided.
The generals state[d] and believed that it was far better to continue fighting
militarily rather than lose politically. ' 59 Bishop Gerardi 60 , the guiding force
behind the Recovery of the Historical Memory (REMHI) project, told the
United States Ambassador at the beginning of the negotiations that the
guerillas saw the government as weak and were consequently riding out the
political situation before committing to serious negotiations. He further
stressed that "while the armed forces may have won the war fought on the
battlefields, the URNG has so far won the war fought in the political arena
'6 1
and in the press."
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis, Guatemala: Challenges to Democracy, Secret Intelligence Memorandum, ALA M93-20125, Aug. 26, 1993, Guatemala and the U.S.,
GU01759, The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
58

59 Army Generals Confront MOD Over Truth Commission, Defense Intelligence

Agency, Secret Cable, Feb. 10, 1994, Guatemala and the U.S., GUO1795, The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C..
60 Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi Conedera was a leading figure in Guatemala's human
rights landscape. Under his guidance, the Catholic Church began the REMHI project to augment the official truth commission report. The report was published in
April of 1998, compiling over 7000 interviews with victims and their families. The
report attributed over 90 percent of the atrocities to the Guatemalan military. Two
days after the report was published, Bishop Gerardi was murdered in his garage.
Three military officers were eventually convicted of the murder though the case
still retains a high degree of ambiguity and various conspiracy theories have been
formulated. For more information on REMHI, see, http://www.fhrg.org/remhi. For
more information about the Gerardi trial, see http://www.ghrc-usa.org/About
Guatemala/TimelineGerardiWebsite.pdf.
61 Marilyn McAfee to Dept. of State, Ambassador Meets with Bishop Gerardi,
United States Embassy, Guatemala, Confidential Cable 012007, Oct. 28, 1993,
Guatemala and the U.S., GU01776, The National Security Archive, Washington,
D.C.
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Nonetheless, given the military's well-known history of violence
and brutality and its sizable influence on the government, the likelihood of a
tribunal or other forms of punitive accountability was very low. In fact,
even a truth commission struck a discordant note with the military. In a
State Department cable from February of 1994, a meeting with the Minister
of Defense is described in which a group of Guatemalan generals express
"extreme displeasure at the course the peace talks were taking regarding the
possibility of a truth commission. ' 62 Like the military of El Salvador, the
Guatemalan military held private reservations over the potential damage a
truth commission would bring. Unlike the El Salvador military who operated from backstage, however, the Guatemalan military's openly influenced
the negotiations. As the officers were quick to mention, "[t]he Salvadoran
Army agreed to a commission since it did not win its war, in contrast to the
Guatemalan Army victory.

63

The URNG, however, would not be content without some form of
justice. A secret cable from the United States Embassy in Guatemala reported that the guerilla forces could not back down from calling for a truth
commission because to do so would "undermine their legitimacy in guerilla
ranks, popular groups and, importantly, among international support
organizations." 64
When the military finally accepted a truth commission, they did so
while expressing severe reservations and injecting strict limitations on its
authority and power. At first, they reportedly demanded full disclosure
from the URNG of its membership base, its activities during the thirty year
conflict, as well as the names of all outside supporters, including nongovernmental organizations, church groups, and foreign governments. 65 Later,
in a discussion with the United States Ambassador to Guatemala, the Guatemalan Minister of Defense reported that the army officer corps had voted
69 to 1 in acceptance of the truth commission, but only under certain
conditions:
62
63

Army Generals Confront MOD Over Truth Commission, supra note 59.
Marilyn McAfee to Dept of State, Peace Process: Truth Commission: a Key

Issue, United States Embassy, Guatemala, Secret Cable 000637, Jan. 20, 1994,
Guatemala and the U.S., GUO1791, The National Security Archive, Washington,
D.C.
64 Id. at §3, 12.
65

Marilyn McAfee to Sec. of State, Background Points from DAO for General

McCaffrey, United States Embassy, Guatemala, Secret Cable 005181, May 27,
1994, Guatemala and the U.S., GUO1824, The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
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The commission would conduct its investigation but the results would initially remain secret. The results would only
be revealed after sufficient time had passed in order that old
passions not be inflamed and generate reprisals against anyone named by the investigation. The MOD [Minister of Defense] did not. specify exactly how long "sufficient time"
would be. Likewise, anyone named by the commission, be
they army or URNG, would have to be immune from
66
prosecution.

Though the army had been persuaded to accept the truth commission for
appearances sake, they were going to minimize its effects as much as
possible.
In Guatemala, the existence of any accountability response was a
testament to the strength of the rebel forces, but the choice of a truth commission instead of trials demonstrated prosecutorial restraint and appeasement towards the military. As the current Deputy Ambassador of
Guatemala to the United Nations admitted, "the army had won the war [...]
but the insurgency had created a lot of awareness and that was why they
were powerful, not man power. For the army to come to terms and settle
everything, they knew it would be open but would not end in trials. '67 Indeed, the commission's mandate reads, "the Commission shall not attribute
responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations and report nor
shall these have any judicial aim or effect." 68 In other words, the commission could exist and attempt to achieve a social accountability of sorts, but
it was forbidden to name any individual perpetrators, preventing any
chances for punitive accountability.
C.

Peru - The Millenarian War

The Peruvian conflict was a conflict of Marxist origins fought bethe
Peruvian government and rebel groups drawn from the poor, rural
tween
communities, the most prominent of which was the Sendero Luminoso, or
Marilyn McAffee to the Sec. of State, Ambassador Meets with MOD, United
States Embassy, Guatemala, Confidential Cable No. 05870- 211742Z June 21,
1994, Guatemala and the U.S. GU01829, The National Security Archives, Washington, D.C.
66

Interview with Jose Alberto Britz Gutierrez, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy
Permanent Representative of Guat. to the U.N. in N.Y., N.Y. (Dec. 14, 2004).
67

Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights
violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to sufOperation, I III.
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68
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the Shining Path. Originally created in the 1960s by Abimael Guzman,
Sendero Luminoso was founded on the principles of Maoist theory and
communistic doctrine. 69 Operating through acts of violence and sabotage
such as car bombings and assassinations, the group targeted leftist organizations, political leaders, and other anti-Marxist individuals and quickly be70
came infamous for their extreme brutality.
The government's response to such tactics was swift and merciless,
authorizing widespread massacres to root out the insurgency's power in the
Peruvian countryside, stating that "[i]f to kill two or three senderistas it is
necessary to kill 80 innocents, then it does not matter... The peasants will
71
have to decide where they wish to die: with Sendero or the armed forces.
According to the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman's office, more than
4000 individuals have disappeared over the past 20 years, 400,000 have
been internally displaced, 30,000 have been victims of political violence,
72
and hundreds of thousands subjected to torture.
Two of the more famous incidents occurred in Barrios Altos, a suburb of Lima, and at La Cantuta University. In November of 1991, a neighborhood gathering in Barrios Altos was interrupted by as gunmen arrived
and fired indiscriminately into the crowd, killing fifteen civilians, including
a young boy. Widely suspected to be a military operation against Sendero
bases, the government displayed little interest or political will in investigating the matter. 73 In July of 1992, a similar group of gunmen took over La
Cantuta University, a historically hot-spot for Sendero Luminoso supporters, and took away nine students and a professor-none were ever seen
again. Once again, the case languished in military trials though the individOrin Stain, Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path
and the Refusal of History, 27 J. LATIN. AM. STUD. 399, 407-409 (1995).
70 Max G. Manwaring, Peru'sSendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons, 541

69

ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 157, 161-62 (1995).

Lewis Taylor, Counter-insurgency strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and
the civil war in Peru, 1980-1996, 17 BULL. LATIN AM. RES., 35, 43 (1998).
72 Report from the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, translated and
documented by the National Security Archive Digital Database. PERU IN 'THE EYE
OF THE STORM', National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 64.
(Tamara Feinstein ed. 2002), available at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/> (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
73 Id., Mike Jacobson, the American Embassy in Lima, to the Secretary of State,
Barrios Altos Massacre: One Month Later, Dept. of State Secret Cable, available
at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/> (last visited Jan. 17,
2009).
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uals responsible for the crimes were widely known. 74 Similar incidents occurred throughout the decade with violent atrocities committed on both
sides. In 1992, governmental forces captured Abimael Guzman, Elena
Ipanaguirre, and several other leaders of the Shinning Path, forcing the
rebels into hiding, operating on through isolated attacks to remind the gov75
ernment of its presence.
Though Fujimori was relatively successful in quelling the movements of Sendero Luminoso, his own heavy-handed approach left the Peruvian public highly critical of his government and his leadership.
Furthermore, his third victory in the 2000 presidential polls was accompanied by rather obvious bribery and manipulation, which quickly expanded
to an expose of the widespread corruption and atrocities running throughout
his administration. Finally, as a last straw, in late 2000, a tape leaked of
Fujimori's right hand, General Vladimiro Montesinos, secretly bribing a
congressman. Due to the mounting pressure surrounding these events,
Fujimori stepped down from power and fled the country in November of
2000, leaving the presidency and the residual pockets of rebel unrest in the
76
hands of interim president Valentin Paniagua.
In June of 2001, Paniagua established the Truth Commission in
Peru with a mandate to investigate the human rights abuses and violations
that occurred on both sides of the civil conflict between May of 1980 and
November of 2000, thus covering the atrocities committed under the Presidential terms of Belaunde, Garcia, and Fujimori. The commission was
called to report on the conditions that led to the violence, to contribute directly to potential judicial accountability pursuits, to propose reparations
possibilities, and to recommend reforms within the governmental system.
While the Peruvian truth commission seemed to occur under absolute regime change, the reality more resembles the continued government
situations in El Salvador and Guatemala; the mere presence of a new government under Toledo does not translate into an absence of power from
former governments and perpetrators. As Eduardo Gonzalez commented,
74 Id., The Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Buenos Aires, General
Asks for Asylum at U.S. Embassy, Says Threat Tied to His Effort to Investigate
Killings, Dept. of State Secret Cable, availableat <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/> (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
75 W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru, 14 SMALL WARS &
INSURGENCIES, 188 (2003).
76 Kees Koonings, "Civil Society, Transitions, and Post-War Reconstruction in
Latin America: A Comparison of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru," presented at
the Conference of the Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution in NUI, Maynooth, 16-17 Feb. 2001, available at http://sociology.nuim.ie/documents/kees.pdf.
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"it is true that some perpetrators were not in power, but not true that all
perpetrators were powerless." He went on to point out that much of the
democratic opposition that ousted Fujimori had previously been governmental officials in the 80s, when a large portion of the atrocities had
occurred.

77

After Fujimori's departure, generals from former administrations
returned to power.78 A few members of Fujimori's own administration continued on with positions of prominence as well. During the interim government, Ketin Vidal, the former head of the police's anti-terrorism unit
credited with the capture of Shining Path leader Guzman, took the position
of interior minister. 79 Many members of the congressional government bore
strong connections to past atrocities and as such, the post-Fujimori Peruvian
legislative body was not devoid of individuals who would be hurt by a
80
thorough investigation and prosecution process.
However, the new government could not gloss over past humanitarian violations completely due to a vocal commitment to human rights and
accountability.8" During the final years of the Fujimori regime, opposing
political parties struck hard at Fujimori's human rights record and repeated
humanitarian violations in their efforts to oust his administration. Due to
the notoriety of Fujimori's atrocities, the selective nature of his targets, and
the unmistakable fingerprints of the perpetrators, the opposition's use of
humanitarian atrocities severely eroded the political legitimacy of
Fujimori's regime. As a result, when Fujimori fell, the new government
was stuck with a self-imposed vigilance against humanitarian violations.
Fujimori's reign of power followed that of Alan Garcia (1985-1990). Though
Garcia's relationship with the military remained shaky and conflicted throughout
his administration, he certainly tolerated their attacks on the Sendero Luminoso,
and even personally authorized the attacks that left 240 prisoners dead in June of
1986. After Fujimori's auto coup of 1992, Garcia claimed asylum in Colombia.
Supra, note 72, The U.S. Embassy in Lima to the Secretary of State, GOP Orders
77

Investigations of Prison Deaths, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/> (last visited May 14, 2005).

Interview with Eduardo Gonzalez, International Center for Transitional Justice,
in N.Y., N.Y., (Dec. 15, 2004).
79 Reuters, Peru's Interim PresidentSwears in Centrist Cabinet, CNN.com, Nov.
78

25, 2000, available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/l1/25/

peru.cabinet.reut/> (last visited May 15, 2005).
80 Database of Politics of the Americas. (2001) Peru: 2001 Presidential Election.
[Internet]. Georgetown University and the Organization of the American States
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Though they may have recognized the double-edged sword and its potential
dangers, they had no choice but to follow through on their threats and
promises to retain legitimacy for their democratic government. As they obviously did not want to risk criminal prosecutions that might incriminate
their own past actions, a truth commission fit the bill.
Admittedly, the new government did not expect or anticipate such a
detailed or forceful truth commission. Many believed that an investigation
would only strengthen their own positions. As Gonzalez lamented, the
problem with the Peruvian truth commission is that "every actor had his
own version of the past and believed it [ . .] many supported the truth
commission because they thought the truth commission would support their
view of history. But they erred in that. Absolutely. ' 82 While they originally
hoped for a document focusing on the atrocities of Fujimori to validate their
own perspectives, they ended up with a document that took an equally objective position with the other governments and the guerilla forces as well,
in a surprisingly unprejudiced and accurate account of the conflict.
Thus, when the truth commission finished its investigations and finally released its findings, some of the very groups spearheading the opposition against Fujimori and calling for accountability found themselves
criticized in the final report.8 3 Cardinal Cipriani, accused by the commission of indifference to the suffering of the Peruvian Indians caught in the
conflict's crossfire, responded with absolute denial, saying, "I do not accept
it because it is not true. ' 84 Retired General Jose Valdiva, accused the commission of pro-Sendero Luminoso bias and commented on the unexpected
tone of the commission, "instead of being honored for the work the armed
forces did, they accuse us for the work we did. That is unjust. '85 The social
elite found themselves unable to swallow the accusations of blame and the
military elite found themselves suddenly faced with real threats of prosecutions. Had they foreseen the results, the military campaigns for full amnesty would likely have found many more supporters.
Finally, a certain amount of credit must be given to the Peruvian
civil society. In fact, the truth commission option was brought to the table
for the first time after the 2000 presidential elections by civil society lead-
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ers. 86 Beginning with the interim government of Paniagua, human rights
activists took on an unprecedented role within politics, with the appointment of Diego Garvia Sayan, a respected human rights expert, as justice
minister. The entire cabinet reeked more of professionalism than politics,
drawn largely from careers other than domestic government.8 7 Following
the interim government's departure, President Toledo appointed Fernando
Olivera to replace Sayan as the new justice minister. Extremely wellknown for his commitments to human rights and accountability, Olivera
was responsible for publicizing the corruption video often credited with the
toppling of Fujimori's administration. 88 In both the interim and Toledo
governments, cabinet posts went to human rights experts with extensive
experience within nongovernmental organizations, confirming a certain
commitment to human rights. 89
In addition to their influence through political posts, civil society
groups built an extremely well-prepared and concentrated case for the need
for accountability. Eduardo Gonzalez, specialist on Peru's post-conflict
transition, described the Peruvian human rights movement as "remarkably
professional and very well organized in comparison with other countries in
the region." 90 The human rights movement also takes the credit for keeping
the possibility of prosecutions open for future discussion, what many regard
as the most valuable aspect of the truth commission. 91 Some analysts go so
far as to credit the human rights movement with the successful campaign
92
for accountability in general.

86 Supra note 72; Juan E. Mendez, The Human Right to Truth: Lessons Learned
from Latin American Experiences with Truth Telling, in TELLING THE TRUTHS 115,

135 (Tristan Anne Borer ed., 2006).
Claudia Cisneros, Peru'sNew Government Fires 15 Generals, CNN.com, Nov.
26, 2000 available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/I 1/26/
peru.cabinet/> (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
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With the complete surrender and exile of Fujimori, the virtual defeat of the Shining Path,93 the potential for self-incrimination, and the lack
of international pressure to pursue judicial accountability, the new Peruvian
government must have seen amnesty or complete inaction as an attractive
option. Some may insist that the truth commission came into existence
under Paniagua, vocally opposed to the Fujimori regime, who thus had no
personal fears of prosecution. However, Paniagua first entered Peruvian
politics under the appointment of President Belaunde and held strong ties to
Belaunde's Accion Popular party, thus linking him to a certain degree with
the atrocities of Belaunde's presidency. 94 Regardless of the qualifications,
the fact remains that a Peruvian political scene acquiesced to a potentially
self-incriminating truth commission explicitly tied to the support of judicial
courts and accountability. 95 The domestic influence of civil society and the
past promises of human rights activist-turned politicians would not allow
impunity, but the continued prominence of the past military and governmental officials removed the option of outright prosecutions. Once again,
the truth commission results from an intricate balance of power.
II.
A.

WARS OF INDEPENDENCE

East Timor: Geopolitics and Sovereignty

The conflict in East Timor stemmed from the fall of the Portuguese
fascist regime, leaving the local Fretilin movement battling for independence with an Indonesian government fearful of a Communistic, left-leaning presence in the region. Supported by the United States and Australia
based on anti-Communistic and regional stability agendas, Jakarta strongly
encouraged Indonesian integration as an alternative. As a result, when Fretilin made its declaration of independence on November 28, 1975, the interThe continued threat of insurgency from the Shining Path and other rebel forces
is explored by Alejandro Sanchez. He claims that the Shining Path has internationalized its movement and is ripe to regain popular support in Peru, taking advantage

93

of the limited economic and military capabilities of the current administration. See,
supra, note 75, at 188.
94 According to polling done by Apoyo published in El Camercio, Paniagua

stands as a frontrunner for the 2006 Presidential elections. See, Paniagua, Garcia
Top Candidates in Peru, ANGUS REID CONSULTING, (Apr. 21, 2005) available at
<http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewltem&itemlD=
6864> (last visited Jan. 20, 2009); The American Embassy in Lima to the Sec. of
State, Peruvian Terrorists Lose the Initiative, supra, note 72, available at <http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/> (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
95 Joanna Crandall, Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: PerpetualImpunity and Transitional Justice Compared, 4 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV 1, 17 (2004).
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national community turned a blind eye to Indonesia's immediate military
offensive and takeover. In fact, President Ford of the United States personally assured President Suharto of Indonesia on the eve of the invasion that
Indonesian actions taken in response would be accepted without questions. 96 The invasion was extremely bloody; by the time East Timor had
become an official province of the Republic of Indonesia, over 80,000
Timorese were dead. 97 As early as 1976, the Security Council passed Resolution 389, calling upon the Indonesian government to "withdraw without
further delay all troops from the Territory." 9 Over the next two decades,
several General Assembly resolutions called for the immediate withdrawal
of Indonesian forces. 99 Indonesia responded to each resolution with complete inaction.10 0 In reality, the non-binding resolutions served more of a
symbolic purpose to pacify calls for an international response to the atrocities committed by Indonesia. 01' During the Cold War, Indonesia became
2
the pet project of Southeast Asia as "the domino that did not fall."' 1 As a
result, the authoritarian regime in Jakarta was rewarded, irrespective of its
abysmal human rights record. Over the course of the next two decades, the
Indonesian government continued its brutal repression of independence
10 3
movements, leading to the deaths of 200,000 Timorese.
After the
under increasing
encourage a free
facing mounting

collapse of the Soviet Union, Western governments came
public pressure to drop their support for Indonesia and
referendum of independence in East Timor.10 4 In 1999,
international pressure and no longer able to depend on
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available at <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivNSAEBBINSAEBB62/>, (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005).
97 Anthony L. Smith, East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation, 15 J.
96

145 (2004).
The UN and East Timor, 12
William
Maley,
98
DEMOCRACY

PACIFICA REVIEW,

63, 64 (2000).

99 Matthew Jardine, East Timor, the United Nations, and the InternationalCommunity: Force Feeding Human Rights Into the InstitutionalizedJaws of Failure,12
PACIFIC REVIEW

47, 52 (2000).

100 Sheila Nair, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the East Timor 'Question,' 14
Global Security, 102 (2000).
101 Maley, supra note 98, at 65.
102 Patrick Candio & Roland Bleiker, Peacebuildingin East Timor, 14 PAC. REV.
63, 65 (2001).
103 Id. at 66.
104 Id. at 65.

206

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15

anti-Communism supporters, the Indonesia government finally allowed a
referendum for independence to be held in East Timor. Though the East
Timorese were under heavy pressure and intimidation from Indonesia, 78.5
percent of the vote went for an independent East Timor. 10 5 In retaliation,
Indonesia paramilitary and governmental forces went on a month-long rampage of destruction against the East Timorese population. In one month,
they murdered 2,000 people, raped hundreds of women and girls, displaced
three-quarters of the population, and demolished seventy-five percent of the
country's infrastructure. 10 6 Under severe international criticism and the
threat of lost IMF funding, the Indonesian government finally withdrew its
troops from East Timor and allowed an Australian-led multinational protection force to take over and assist in East Timor's transition to
independence. 107
The truth commission was established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in July of 2001 with a mandate to investigate human
rights violations, to facilitate reconciliation and reintegration of minor criminal offenders through "Community Reconciliation Processes," and to make
recommendations on the promotion of human rights and reconciliation. 0 8
Surprising those who expected the usual mix of academics and political
figures, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)
was comprised of seven individuals drawn from the legal profession, the
church, civil society, human rights organizations, and the corporate world.
Granted the power to authorize searches and seizures of persons and property, the CAVR had broad investigatory powers over crimes committed during the Indonesian occupancy from 1974 to 1999, leaving the crimes
committed in the violent aftermath of the 1999 referendum to the judgments
of the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit. Crimes committed since independence have been deemed more appropriate for local prosecution; even if
they are tied to events that occurred during the occupation or month-long
post-referendum period, they are nonetheless turned over to the local
Timorese courts.
Though a loud international outcry followed the violence of 1999,
according to Frederick Rawski, former member of the UN human rights
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monitoring team in East Timor, the United Nations quickly backed off from
pushing for trials and prosecutions due to geopolitical sensitivity towards
Indonesia. 10 9 Given the comparative strength of Indonesia to East Timor,
even unanimous East Timorese calls for prosecutions would be extremely
difficult without the full weight of the international community. In fact,
even the East Timorese are less than anxious for actual prosecutions to occur, which helps to explain their support for the truth commission and their
caution in regards to serious criminal proceedings. Rawski, drawing from
his experiences in the eventual production of the commission's report, commented, "The balance of power between the former enemies is by far the
most important aspect here. East Timor is grasping for leverage in areas that
are far more important to the government than justice, no matter how important that is. [... ] East Timor's fate is inextricably tied to Indonesia in
every way.""10 Another scholar summarized, "[the East Timorese government] would be happy with a truth commission that says well, this is what
happened, we suffered a lot, [but] let's close the books.""' When questioned on this issue, Neil Kritz, director of the US Institute of Peace's Rule
of Law program, agreed that a certain "political weariness" existed on the
part of the government officials to press too hard on accountability and
prosecution. In fact, he noted that even when the international prosecutor in
East Timor wanted to pursue some of the crimes and perpetrators, there was
a real unease in having to proceed on the part of the East Timorese government. 1 2 Rawski confessed that he has been amazed at the intensity of the
Timorese government's avoidance of confrontation, which rhetorically undermines accountability efforts that have taken place." 3
In addition to the geopolitical concerns, East Timor's quest for punitive justice is blocked by sovereign jurisdiction issues. As of 2004, the
Serious Crimes Unit of East Timor has issued 81 indictments out of a list of
369 accused individuals." 14 Of the 369, however, 281 remain in Indonesia,
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the East Timorese courts. Even if Dili
were seeking full judicial accountability under another form of prescriptive
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jurisdiction, the Indonesian perpetrators are protected by the Indonesian
government's refusal to extradite them for prosecution elsewhere. Unfortunately, the Indonesian created tribunal and the convictions made in that
court have been, as one expert noted, "a true farce-all the military officers
were acquitted. There were two people convicted, the only two East
Timorese on trial, and they were both acquitted on appeal.", 15 It becomes
extremely difficult to justify the trial and punishment of less serious offenders in East Timor when their counterparts guilty of much heavier atrocities
in Indonesia remain free. Former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre
Prosper did note that "the fact that [the Indonesians] went through some
prosecutions, however, is somewhat promising-since they weren't open to
doing that before. The fact that they're willing to raise the profile of the
' 16
need for accountability [is promising].
Finally, from a broader perspective, attempts to investigate the past
oppressive acts of a sovereign state against its own peoples runs into tricky
questions of sovereignty. While human rights groups would immediately
point to international treaties and agreements, such as the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
and jus cogens norms prohibiting such brutality and violence, many governments would insist that a government's actions within its territorial borders
are barred from any outside review. In East Timor's case, the United Nations conveniently by-stepped the issue by adopting Portugal's view that
Indonesia's original occupation was illegal, which meant that East Timor
remained a non-self-governing territory. 117 Even so, the United Nations
would likely have faced heavier opposition from traditionally pro-sovereignty nations had it attempted to bring about harsher forms of judicial
accountability.
Given East Timor's eagerness to avoid confrontation, one might
wonder why any trials or truth commissions were formed at all. While the
severity of the violence led to such furor amongst international human
rights organizations that demanded a just response, it must be noted that
East Timor's situation is different from all other truth commissions established to date in one critical aspect: it was created by a legal act of the
United Nations. Though the East Timorese cabinet signed off on the basic
concept of a truth commission, the commission's membership, scope, and
all other attributes were determined by UNTAET's Human Rights Unit,
Interview with Frederick Rawski, supra note 109.
116 Interview with Pierre Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 27, 2005).
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albeit after consultation with international and local experts. 118 Indonesian
hopes for blanket amnesty and non-investigation could not trump UNTAET's mandate.
Furthermore, the threat of prosecutions from an international tribunal, however slight, would have prompted Indonesian support for any alternatives. According to Rawski, "the threat of an international tribunal led to
the compromise of hybrid tribunals, [and] the threat of the international
community enforcing some of the indictments through Interpol led to the
consideration of truth and reconciliation as a better fit." ' 19 Rawski also suggests that East Timor was prudent in accepting the compromises, if it had
instead waited for the international community to fulfill their pledges and
promises, the truth commission and the Special Court would likely still be
0
nonexistent.12
East Timor's experience highlights the particular difficulties arising
from transitions of independence. Newly independent states will, by definition, be weaker, less experienced, and less influential on the international
playing field. The likelihood of establishing a truth commission to investigate crimes committed against its people during pre-independence periods
is, consequently, extremely low. Only with the direct involvement of the
United Nations was East Timor able to pursue a transitional justice mechanism. Even then, the geopolitical status of Indonesia squashed any chance
of substantial prosecutions. Unfortunately, the truth commission in East
Timor likely represents the most a newly independent state could possibly
hope for.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW-MAKERS

In each story chronicled above, the details and circumstances were
different, but the central theme was always of limitations and a need for
compromise.
In the analysis of El Salvador, the conflict clearly depended on the
heavy support of foreign governments; at the height of the Cold War, the El
Salvadorian government received over 197 million dollars worth of U.S.
economic and military aid. 12 ' Without such extensive support, analysts
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doubt that the government could have avoided military defeat. 122 After the
fall of the Soviet Union and the consequential retraction of the copious
foreign financiers, the El Salvadorian government and the FMLN could no
longer sustain the conflict, resulting in a drawn-out strategic stalemate on
the battlefield. Having seen the writing on the wall, the parties reluctantly
123
came to the negotiating table.
The truth commission in Guatemala was another result of give-andtake. The URNG's lack of military power led to a certain amount of
desperation at the negotiations, lowering their bargaining power for
stronger accountability. 124 The government's stance on accountability was
essentially irrelevant given their close relationship with the military. While
the military did not lack strength on the battlefield, it feared political ramifications. 25 Though none of the parties saw the truth commission as the best
option, all accepted it as the lowest common denominator.
Peru was even further constrained, given the continued political
participation of governmental officials and military officers with ties to the
human rights atrocities. In fact, President Toledo's closest competitor in
the 2001 elections was former President Garcia, directly responsible for
countless atrocities committed by the armed forces under his rule. 126 Defeated by a mere five percent in the second round run-off vote, Garcia remains active within the Peruvian political scene. 127 Similarly, Ketin Vidal,
the former head of the police's anti-terrorism unit credited with the capture
28
of Shining Path leader Guzman, assumed the position of interior minister.1
Yet, having built their case against Fujimori based on human rights viola122
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tions, Toledo's government had to provide the powerful Peruvian civil soci129
ety with some form of accountability.
Finally, East Timor, where the story boiled down to a single factor:
Indonesia. 130 Though Indonesia's economic and security powers prevented
any endeavors against the wishes of Jakarta, extreme international outcry
following the 1999 massacres led to a certain expectation of reprimands. 3 '
In particular, "the threat of an international tribunal led to the compromise
of hybrid tribunals, [and] the threat of the international community enforcing some of the indictments through Interpol led to the consideration of
1 2
truth and reconciliation."
The analysis of the balance of power within these case studies suggests an underestimated relevancy of domestic power dynamics to the establishment of a truth commission. In each case, compromise was
necessary in moving forward with transitional justice; the truth commission
always emerged as the "last option standing."
There are two main implications of this research for academics and
policymakers dealing with post-civil conflict transitional justice and the option of establishing a truth commission. The first stems directly from the
findings of this Article: policy makers and academics should focus more on
the effects of domestic power dynamics. More importantly, however, a
shift should be made from examining transitional justice mechanisms as an
ends-based choice to a means-based choice.
Policy-makers and scholars need to realize that due to political factors and restrictions, every transitional justice option may not be available.
Ratner and Abrams, in their discussion of human rights accountability,
write that, "in choosing the means by which to advance these goals [of
punishment, deterrence, trauma relief, reparations, or reforms], states must
balance the legal, ethical, and social imperatives served by each approach
against its social and political risks and costs," implying that all transitional
options are available and that policymakers should pick transitional mecha33
nisms based on their potential effects instead of their innate feasibility.
Gary Bass, in an attempt to convince policymakers of the superiority of
trials to informal acts of vengeance, simply assumes that trials are possible
- telling policymakers "[i]f at first you don't succeed, try again."'134 By
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focusing on why governments should support a tribunal, he ignores the
question of whether governments could actually establish one. Aryer Neier
similarly pushes for the rejection of amnesty agreements on the grounds
that "justice should be done" without acknowledging the potential impossibility of formal justice. 3 5 Martha Minow, while acknowledging the need
for widespread societal cooperation and sufficient investigative authority
and noting that difficulties could arise in the testimonies of victims who
were also perpetrators, 136 nonetheless maintains that the potential benefits
of truth commissions far outweigh the potential costs and that consequentially, they should always be considered. 3 7 By assuming that each transitional justice option is possible, the current research focuses almost
exclusively on the effects of transitional justice.
My research suggests, however, that the options available to a state
after a civil conflict may be limited by the domestic power dynamics.
Though the Guatemalan government may have preferred trials as a way to
exercise control the military, the military's lingering influence excluded the
possibility of harsher forms of accountability. Though much of Peru's government may have preferred to forget the past and avoid any chances for
prosecution, the restraints of civil society and democratic promises resulted
in a truth commission. In such situations, the government's available
means overruled their preferred ends.
CONCLUSION

Academics and policy makers alike should take note of this divergence from the traditional transitional justice literature. On the academic
end, further research should be devoted to the causes of specific transitional
justice mechanisms. Given that specific circumstances and factors may remove options such as trials or truth commissions from the table, academics
should focus more on the discovery and analysis of those circumstances and
factors. Understanding what works best for a conflict is relatively pointless
without first understanding what could work. On the policy end, governments and international organizations should realize that the choice to implement a truth commission or trial is not independent from domestic
political restraints. Instead of debating the appropriateness of specific options, they should instead focus on the feasibility of each option. Though
truth commissions serve a great need within transitional justice and societal
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reconciliation, they generally rank low on the wish lists of governmental
and rebel negotiators. Time and time again, the truth commission emerges
as a compromise between parties. In hindsight, many countries and transitional governments could have saved themselves valuable time and resources if the options available to them had been clear from the outset. To
better deal within the chaos that is transitional justice, we should focus our
energies on removing tangles as opposed to further defining current tangles.

